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ABSTRACT 
 This paper illustrates how tools-based theoretical models, like Lester 
Salamon’s, can be used to predict the outcome of policy tools. Theodore Lowi and 
Lester Salamon’s theoretical models were applied to select provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) to generate predictions regarding their outcomes. The 
validity of these predictions was assessed by comparing them to current empirical 
data and trends. Ultimately, this paper sought to demonstrate how tools-based models 
can be used to predict policy tool outcomes relatively accurately. Our evaluation used 
Lowi’s original model detailed in his Four systems of policy, politics, and choice 
(1972) paper and Salamon’s model detailed in his book, The tools of government: A 
guide to new governance (2002).  Lowi’s model was applied to the ACA to illustrate 
why theoretical models need to allow for the multidimensional nature of public 
policy. The limited classification system Lowi’s model employs ultimately prevented 
it from generating any useful predictions for the selected provisions of the ACA. 
Because Salamon’s model allowed for the multidimensional nature of public policy 
and policy tools, it was able to generate relatively accurate predictions. However, 
Salamon’s model and other tools-based approaches still require much improvement to 
be useful to policymakers today. A universal, less subjective classification system is 
needed to classify policy tools. Additionally, the predicted outcomes of policy tools 
need to be more clearly defined and qualitatively defined. If these improvements are 
made, the predictions generated by tools-based models will be replicable and thus of 
greater utility to policymakers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 In 1964, the famous political scholar, Theodore Lowi, posed the question, 
“…how much farther along the road of political theory are we?” (Lowi, 1964a). Since 
asking this question, Lowi developed a theoretical model to predict the political 
outcomes of public policies. Throughout his studies, Lowi proved the utility of his 
model, but as some critics, like Lester Salamon, pointed out his model did possess 
several limitations. In part a response to Lowi, Salamon created his own theoretical 
model intended to predict the outcomes not of public policies but of the policy tools 
their programs implemented. Since Salamon’s model, several other models have been 
created to predict the outcome of policy tool implementation. Together, these models 
have been known as “the tool-based approach.” Although tools-based models allow 
for the multidimensional nature of public policy, no consensus has been reached 
regarding how to classify policy tools. Because of this, several analysts, such as 
Charles Lindblom, have questioned their utility (Salamon, 2002; Lindblom, 1990). 
This paper seeks to illustrate the advantages of using tool-based models to predict 
policy tool outcomes. First, we will apply Lowi’s model to one of the most prominent 
policies of the 21st century, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), to demonstrate why 
theoretical models need to allow for the multidimensional nature of public policy. 
Then, we will apply Salamon’s model to the ACA and compare Lowi and Salamon’s 
predictions for select provisions of the ACA to current empirical data and trends. 
Ultimately, we hope to illustrate how tools-based models, such as Salamon’s, can be 
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used to predict the outcomes of policy tools. We also will address how tools-based 
models can be improved to make them useful to policymakers today.  
 This paper is organized into five major sections. To begin, we will discuss the 
conditions that spurred the ACA’s creation; its major provisions; its origins; and the 
outcomes seen today. In the second section, we will discuss Lowi’s model and 
generate predictions for selected provisions of the ACA. The third section discusses 
Salamon’s model and also uses it to generate predictions for the ACA. In the fourth 
section, we will compare Lowi and Salamon’s predictions for the ACA to current 
empirical data and trends, assessing their models’ relative accuracy and utility in 
predicting policy or policy tool outcomes. Finally, in the fifth section, we state our 
general conclusions. 
I. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
A. HEALTHCARE PRIOR TO THE ACA: WHAT SPURRED THE 
CREATION OF THE ACA? 
 Although many of the major healthcare policies implemented in the US prior 
to the ACA, such as Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP, extended coverage to millions of 
Americans, in 2010 alone, 49.9 million Americans were uninsured, accounting for 
16.3% of the population (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith, 2011). Since 1987, the 
number of uninsured individuals in the US had steadily increased, rising from nearly 
31 million in 1987 to the 49.9 million uninsured in 2010 (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and 
Smith, 2011). Thus, since 1987, 18.9 million addition US citizens have remained 
uninsured, meaning approximately 8,200,000 individuals have become or remained 
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uninsured per year from 1987-2010. Despite the consistently increasing number of 
uninsured individuals, the percentage of the US population without insurance has 
increased very little since 1987, rising from approximately 14.0% to 16.3% in 2010, 
which means since 1987 the percentage of uninsured Americans has increased by a 
factor of a little over 1 (1.16%). These statistics indicate that while the number of 
uninsured Americans has continued to significantly increase, the percentage of the 
American population attributed to this increase has grown relatively little since the 
late 1980s. This indicates approximately the same percentage of the population (a 
little larger percent since 1987) has remained uninsured for nearly 30 years, implying 
policies employed thus far have been ineffective at expanding coverage or targeting 
appropriate subgroups of the population. Thus, although enrollment numbers may 
have increased, this increase has been offset by the simultaneous increase in 
uninsured individuals. Indeed, between 2009 and 2010, both the numbers of 
uninsured and insured increased. These trends are depicted below in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Number Uninsured & Uninsured Rate in the US from 1987-2010 
(DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2011) 
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Despite cost control mechanisms and a transition to the managed care delivery 
system, costs have also continued to increase with rising numbers of uninsured. In 
2010, national healthcare expenditures comprised 17.1% of GDP (The World Bank 
Group, 2016). Since as early as 1960, US healthcare expenditures have been rapidly 
increasing despite cost control efforts and were projected to continue increasing, as 
shown on the next page in Figure 2 (Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Affordability has also continued to be an issue despite Medicare, Medicaid, 
and CHIP’s subsidization of healthcare for various vulnerable population subgroups. 
According to studies conducted by the Commonwealth Fund (2013), affordability has 
significantly impacted Americans’ ability to gain insurance coverage. In fact, in a 
survey conducted by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation in 2013, 61% of adult 
respondents said the main reason they are without insurance coverage is because the 
Figure 2: Prior and Predicted National Healthcare Spending (% of GDP) 
Source: Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 2016 
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cost of insurance is too high or they lost their job and subsequently could not afford to 
purchase private health insurance coverage (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2013). These findings suggested cost-related access barriers were the primary reason 
many adults in the US have remained and continue to remain uninsured (The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013; Commonwealth Fund, 2013). 
B. INTRODUCTION TO THE ACA AND ITS MAJOR PROVISIONS 
In response to these issues, in 2010, President Barack Obama signed into 
legislation the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which became commonly 
referred to as the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA’s key features focused on 
increasing affordability, expanding coverage, and protecting consumers (U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services, 2015a). Although it did contain some 
provisions for cost containment, these provisions were sparse and thus in some ways 
suggest that the ACA’s primary focus is not to control costs but rather expand 
coverage and increase affordability. Cost containment provisions found within the 
ACA include standardized billing, mandated electronic exchange of PHI, and limited 
tax exclusions on employer-based plans (U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services, 2015a). The following paragraphs discuss some of the ACA’s provisions for 
increasing affordability, expanding coverage, and protecting consumers. The ACA 
has numerous provisions so only a few, select major provisions are discussed.  
 The ACA’s creation of federal-state health insurance markets serve as its 
primary provision to increase healthcare affordability (U.S. Department of Health & 
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Human Services, 2015a). State health insurance markets offer standardized healthcare 
plans regulated by the federal governments. Each state can customize their standard 
benefits package but must offer the 10 essential benefits mandated by the federal 
government, which include: ambulatory or outpatient care, hospital treatments, 
maternity services, laboratory tests, emergency room care, pediatric care, mental 
health services, preventative care, prescription drug coverage, and rehabilitative care 
and necessary equipment. Qualifying individuals choosing to purchase health 
insurance through federal-state health insurance markets are eligible for federal 
subsidies. These subsidies are offered to individuals earning between 100-400% of 
the poverty line who are unable to obtain health insurance through their employer. By 
offering consumers alternatives to private providers, the ACA aimed to increase 
competition within the private market, driving down market equilibrium prices within 
the private sector and thus increasing the affordability of health insurance to 
consumers. Additionally, under the ACA, small businesses began receiving tax 
credits to ease the financial burden of providing health insurance for employees. The 
ACA also expanded services covered under Medicare, offering certain preventative 
services to Medicare recipients at no cost, while also giving Medicare Part D 
enrollees up to 50% off on certain name-brand prescription medications. Finally, the 
ACA also mandated insurance providers replace their 5:1 age-rating band with a 3:1 
age-rating band, meaning insurers can now only charge older individuals up to three 
times as much as younger individuals for the same policy while before the ACA they 
could charge older individuals up to five times as much.  
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  The ACA also possessed several provisions intended to expand coverage. The 
ACA’s individual and employer mandates serve as its primary mechanisms for 
expanding coverage. The employer mandate required firms with 50 or more 
employees to provide health insurance for their employees (U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services, 2015a). Likewise, the individual mandate required all 
Americans to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty fine that increases 
substantially each additional year an individual does not acquire health insurance 
coverage. Provisions for voluntary Medicaid expansion were also intended to further 
expand coverage. These provisions would reimburse states electing to expand 
Medicaid coverage 100% of the initial expansion costs although reimbursement rates 
would decline and eventually cease with time. The ACA also mandated young adults 
could remain on their parents’ insurance up till age 26 and allows retirees between the 
ages of 55 and 65 as well as their spouses and dependents to continue receiving 
coverage through their employer-provided plans.  
Provisions intended to protect consumers from the substantial market power 
of private health insurance providers are also included in the ACA. The ACA 
prohibits pre-existing conditions clauses, rescinding coverage (using a technical 
errors to deny coverage of services when sick), and lifetime limits on essential health 
benefits (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2015a). These provisions 
were intended to not just protect consumers from self-interested, profit-maximizing 
private providers but also increase their access to affordable care Increasing 
competition within the private sector by creating state and federal health insurance 
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marketplaces also served to further protect consumers by decreasing the market 
power of private firms. Thus, by targeting specific barriers to obtaining health 
insurance while simultaneously expanding coverage of those already insured, the 
ACA aimed to increase health insurance coverage both directly and indirectly, which 
it ultimately hoped would significantly reduce the number of uninsured individuals in 
the US. A summary of the ACA’s major provisions that were discussed can be found 
below in Table 1.  
Table 1: A Summary of the Discussed Major Provisions of the ACA 
Increase 
Affordability 
1) Federal/state health insurance marketplaces 
 Income-based subsidies 
2) Small business tax credits 
3) Expanded Medicare services 
4) Mandated 3:1 age-rating band  
Expand Coverage 1) Employer mandate 
2) Individual mandate 
3) Voluntary Medicaid expansion 
4) Young adults remain on parents’ insurance until age 26 
5) Retirees 55-65 and their spouses and dependents retain 
employer-provided plans 
Protect Consumers 1) Prohibits: 
 Pre-existing condition clauses 
 Rescinding coverage 
 Lifetime limits on essential benefits 
2) State/federal health insurance marketplaces: increase 
competition  
 
C. ORIGINS OF THE ACA 
The Affordable Care Act was signed into law on March 23, 2010 (Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010). There were several bills leading up to 
the final version of the ACA, which is considered to be H.R. 3590 and H.R.4872 read 
together (Affordable Health California, 2016; Smith 2012).  
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The origination of the ACA is quite convoluted. Initially, both the House and 
Senate drafted their own versions of the bill. The House’s version was H.R.3962 or 
the Affordable Health Care for American Act (Affordable Health Care for American 
Act of 2009). At this time, the GOP enjoyed a majority in the House, preventing 
House Democrats from fully fulfilling their desires for the House’s version of the bill 
(Affordable Health California, 2016; Smith, 2012). Essentially, because the 
Democrats were displeased with the House bill, they decided to draft another version 
of the bill in the Senate, where they enjoyed a majority and could push more desirable 
legislation forward (Smith, 2012) Because all revenue bills must originate in the 
House, the Senate found a qualifying bill that had both originated and passed in the 
House, H.R.3590, which was originally titled the Service Members Home Ownership 
Tax Act of 2009 (Affordable Health California, 2016; Coleman et al., 2012; Smith, 
2012). The original H.R.3590 had nothing to do with health care (Service Members 
Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009). This bill merely amended the Internal Revenue 
Code and essentially served as a military housing bill. To create their version of the 
ACA, the Senate stripped H.R.3590 of its original language and intent, forming the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010). When the Senate initially created the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act under H.R.3590, the Democrats enjoyed a majority that allowed them to get 
just enough votes to pass the bill (Affordable Health California, 2016; Smith, 2012). 
The amended H.R.3590 was then sent to the Conference Committee. All House bills 
amended by the Senate are sent to the Conference Committee, where the differences 
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between the House and amended Senate bill are negotiated and resolved (Coleman et 
al., 2012). If the bill is further amended in the Conference Committee, both the House 
and Senate must vote to pass the same version of the resolved bill. Unfortunately for 
the Democratic Party, after the amended H.R.3590 was passed in the Senate, 
Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy passed away and was replaced by Republican 
Senator Scott Brown, making the Democrats lose their majority in the Senate 
(Affordable Health California, 2016; Smith, 2012). Without this majority, the 
Democrats would not be able to pass a resolved version of H.R.3590 if the House 
proposed additional amendments in the Conference Committee. To ensure legislation 
got passed, Democratic and Republican House and Senate party leaders collaborated 
to come to an agreement: the House would not amend H.R.3590 any further and 
allow it to pass, however the Senate must pass a separate bill created by the House 
that made changes to the version of the ACA proposed under the Senate’s amended 
H.R.3590. The separate bill created by the House was known as the Reconciliation 
Act of 2010 (H.R.4872) and made a number of financing and revenue changes to 
H.R.3590 (Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010). As mentioned, 
when read together, H.R.4872 and H.R.3590 detail the provisions of the ACA 
implemented today.  
D. OUTCOMES OF THE ACA 
i. POLARIZED PARTY POLITICS AND POLITICAL VOLATILITY  
As our brief discussion of the evolution of the ACA suggests, the ACA was a 
highly controversial bill. Throughout the legislation process, the GOP strongly 
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contested the ACA (Affordable Health California, 2016; Smith 2012; Blodget, 2013; 
GOP, 2011a; GOP, 2011b). The GOP’s primary concern was regarding the economic 
impacts the ACA may have (Blodget, 2013; GOP, 2011a). Republicans believed the 
ACA would devastate the American economy by forcing businesses to spend too 
much on health care, leading to employment cutbacks, preferential hiring of part-time 
versus full-time workers, and in some cases business failure. The GOP believed the 
funds demanded by the ACA would significantly increase healthcare costs and 
ultimately add substantially to the national deficit (GOP, 2011a). Republicans 
believed the ACA would increase costs for both employers and health insurance 
providers, causing insurance premiums to rise and potentially forcing Americans 
happy with their current health insurance plans would lose them (GOP, 2011b). The 
GOP also found tax increases implemented by the ACA to fund several of its 
provisions excessive (GOP, 2011a). Ultimately, the GOP believed the ACA would be 
incredibly detrimental to both the American economy and quality of care provided by 
the health care system. On the exact opposite end of the political spectrum, the 
Democratic Party argued the ACA was essential to making health insurance both 
affordable and available to all Americans (Democrats, 2016). The polarized views of 
both parties divided both the House and Senate, creating the tumultuous legislative 
process described earlier.  
Since the ACA’s passage, the GOP and several states have questioned the 
constitutionality of both its origins and some of its provisions (Elias, 2013; GOP, 
2011a). The GOP argued the ACA was essentially introduced in the Senate, making it 
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an unconstitutional bill since all bills raising revenue must originate from the House. 
Some party members also argued the individual mandate violated the Commerce 
Clause, which mandates that the government cannot force citizens to engage in 
commerce. Throughout 2011, several states filed joint lawsuits claiming the ACA’s 
individual mandate and originally mandated Medicaid expansion were 
unconstitutional and violated state sovereignty (Smith, 2012; The Henry J. Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2012). Ultimately, political discontent and turmoil did not settle 
until 2012 when the US Supreme Court issued its final decisions. While this ruling 
upheld the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate, it ruled the original 
mandated expansion of Medicaid to be unconstitutional, forcing this provision to 
become voluntary for states. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s decision, with the upcoming 2016 presidential 
election, the GOP remains firm in its position against the ACA and has begun taking 
new measures to repeal it (Benson, 2016; Walsh, 2016; Kim, 2015). With a 
Republican majority in the Senate, in 2015, the Senate passed a bill that would 
essentially “gut Obamacare” of the majority of its mandates, taxes, and expenditures 
(Benson, 2016). However, the Senate also ruled that the bill’s provisions to repeal the 
employer and individual mandate must be removed in order for it to proceed, stating 
these provisions did not pass the Byrd test (Kim, 2015). Since passing in the Senate, 
the House has also passed the bill, moving it to President Obama who has since 
vetoed it (Walsh, 2016). Although President Obama has defeated GOP efforts to 
repeal the ACA, if a Republican wins the 2016 presidential election, the GOP will 
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surely renew its efforts and succeed in the years to come, especially since it now has a 
majority in both the House and Senate.  
ii. STATE & FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACES 
ACHIEVED MIXED SUCCESS 
Enrollment in state and federal health insurance exchanges has been steadily 
increasing since 2014 with enrollment rising from 8.0 million in 2014 to 11.7 million 
in 2015 (Levitt et al., 2016). At the end of the 2016 enrollment period, 12.7 million 
US citizens were covered under state and federal exchange plans. Actual enrollment, 
however, has been somewhat lower than these statistics indicate. Enrollment typically 
drops throughout the course of each year as individuals do not pay their premiums or 
have their coverage terminated “…due to inconsistencies on their applications” 
(Levitt et al., 2016). Attrition further reduces yearly enrollment as some enrollees 
acquire employer-provided coverage. For example, the number of paid enrollees 
dropped from 10.2 million at the end of March 2015 to 9.3 million by the end of 
September. Accounting for these fluctuations, enrollment is projected to be over 10 
million by the end of 2016, meeting Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) target for 2016 enrollment (Levitt et al., 2016; U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2015b). Although projected 2016 enrollment, meets HHS’s target 
for enrollment, it falls short of earlier projections issued by the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO), which have been used as “…an implicit yardstick for judging the law” 
since its origination (Levitt et al., 2016). Originally, the CBO projected 2016 
enrollment to be around 21 million and has since lowered this projection to 13 million 
(Levitt et al., 2016; CBO, 2016).  
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There are several reasons why enrollment in state and federal marketplace 
plans has failed to meet CBO projections (Levitt et al., 2016). Contrary to the GOP’s 
claims, the ACA has not reduced the availability of employer-provided coverage. 
According to the Kaiser-HRET Employer Health Benefits Survey, the number of 
firms offering employees coverage did not experience any statistically significant 
reductions between 2014 and 2015, noting 55% and 57% of firms offered coverage in 
2014 and 2015 respectively (Claxton et al., 2015). Thus, it appears “…it may be that 
incentives for employers to maintain health benefits are more power than expected, at 
least so far” (Levitt et al., 2016). Most employers with 50 or more full-time 
employees face more to gain than lose by refusing to offer employees health 
insurance coverage. Under the ACA, employees receive employer-provided insurance 
benefits tax-free plus non-compliant employers face significantly penalty fines.   
While the ACA’s enrollment numbers may seem large, its current 12.7 million 
paid enrollees are less than 4.00% of the current US population (Levitt et al., 2016). 
These figures indicate the majority of US citizens continue to obtain coverage outside 
of state and federal exchanges. Outside coverage includes ACA-compliant plans, 
grandfathered coverage, and transitional plans. Although no actual data exists 
regarding the actual number or percentage of plans purchase outside of state and 
federal exchanges, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation has estimated 57% of 
individual coverage (i.e. non-group plans) was purchased outside marketplaces by the 
end of 2014 (Levitt et al., 2016; Levitt et al., 2015).  
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Although 82% of marketplace enrollees are receiving ACA subsidies, a 
substantial majority of the American publican still sites affordability as an obstacle 
(Levitt et al., 2016). A poll conducted by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 
found that 46% of uninsured, non-elderly adults reported that they did attempt to 
obtain coverage but were not able to afford it (Levitt et al., 2016; DiJulio et al., 
2015a). Individuals with annual income less than 150% of the poverty level qualify 
for the largest premium subsidies available under the ACA, however these individuals 
are generally still required “…to pay something towards the premium” (Levitt et al., 
2016). For example, to enroll in Silver plan, low-income individuals with incomes at 
150% of the poverty level must pay up to around 4% of their income in premiums. 
Premium subsidies offered to individuals with incomes 300-400% of the poverty 
level typically run out quickly, leaving these individuals with little incentive (or 
possibly ability) to retain coverage. The largest drops in health insurance coverage 
have been among individuals with incomes greater than 400% of the poverty level. 
Thus, even with these subsidies, low-income Americans may still feel health 
insurance is unaffordable. However, whether affordability is truly an issue or as much 
as an issue as these polls indicate remains unclear. Another poll conducted by the 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation at the beginning of the 2016 enrollment period 
“…found that 82% of uninsured adults had not been contacted in the previous 6 
months about the health law” (Levitt et al., 2016; DiJulio et al., 2015b). These 
findings indicate a general lack of public awareness about the financial assistance 
available under the ACA. More extensive outreach efforts to increase public 
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awareness may reduce the percentage of Americans who still find insurance coverage 
to be unaffordable. 
Despite lower enrollment than projected by the CBO, enrollment has 
continued to grow, suggesting the program will be sustainable (Levitt et al., 2016). 
Growth is critical to the program’s sustainability as it must continue to remain 
attractive to insurers and keep premiums stable. Because risk is pooled at the state 
level, “…if enrollment stagnates and skews towards sicker-than-average 
individuals…,” insurers may be forced to increase premiums as costs may exceed 
revenue, decreasing affordability and creating additional problems. Although current 
data indicates “…there is considerable room for enrollment growth over the next 
several years,” enrollment would still fall short of CBO projections even if all states 
had the same enrollment rates as the 10 states with the highest enrollment rates. This 
suggests CBO projections may have been unrealistic and improper for assessing the 
relative success of state and federal exchanges. Despite this potential for growth, 
affordability and outreach issues pose a significant threat. Levitt et al. (2016) has 
stated, “…absent a substantial boost in outreach or changes to the subsidies to make 
insurance more affordable, substantial increases in marketplace enrollment are 
unlikely.” Thus, although state and federal exchanges have extended coverage to 
some Americans and possess potential for significant growth, affordability and 
outreach issues have and will continue to reduce future growth if not addressed.  
Although state and federal health insurance exchanges have been relatively 
successful, lack of proper government oversight recently caused a dozen exchanges to 
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fail, costing the federal government over $1.2 billion (Levin & Goldstein, 2016). The 
Senate’s investigations panel concluded “…federal officials ignored early warnings 
about the plans’ fragility and moved in too late as problems arose” (Levin & 
Goldstein, 2016). The exchanges’ failure left almost three quarters of a million people 
in 14 different states without coverage. Hospitals and doctors may never get 
reimbursed for their services. The failure of these CO-OPs has imposed significant 
social and financial costs. As Senator Rob Portman (R-Ohio) proclaimed, “‘These 
failed CO-OPs were a costly experiment gone wrong, and real people got hurt — 
including the more than 700,000 Americans who lost their health plans’” (Levin & 
Goldstein, 2016). These public and social costs have exacerbated already failing 
public approval of the ACA’s health insurance exchanges, which may give the GOP 
further leverage in its efforts to repeal the ACA.  
iii. PERCENTAGE OF UNINSURED AMERICANS AT HISTORIC LOW 
One of the clearest outcomes of the ACA is that the percentage and numbers 
of uninsured Americans have and continue to decrease (Alonso-Zaldivar, 2016; 
WHO, 2015). From 2010-2014, the number of uninsured individuals in the US fell 
from 49.9 million to 33.0 million while the uninsured rate subsequently fell from 
16.3% to 10.4%, achieving the most significant change in the uninsured rate 
throughout the entire history of the United States (WHO, 2015). While some have 
claimed these gains were due to the economy’s spring-back from the 2007-2009 
recession, economist Christine Eibner of the RAND Corporation states, “‘This kind 
of shift in insurance I don't think can be explained by the economy. The increase (in 
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coverage) is large enough that it can't be driven by just economic recovery’” (Alonso-
Zaldivar, 2016). Clearly, coverage has increased because of the ACA.  
Which provision stimulated the majority of these gains? There currently exists 
no data regarding how many or the percentage of the individuals who have acquired 
health insurance due to the individual mandate. As previously discussed, enrollment 
in state and federal exchanges encompasses a very small percentage of the population 
with most individuals purchasing health insurance outside of federal CO-OPs (Levitt 
et al., 2016). According to the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, 
approximately 3 million American gained employer-based coverage between 2010 
and 2014, which can be attributed to the ACA’s employer mandate (Alonso-Zaldivar, 
2016; Census Bureau, 2014). However, the largest gains have been attritubed to 
states’ elective expansion of Medicaid (Alonso-Zaldivar, 2016; Haislmaier & 
Gonshorowski, 2014). In the second quarter of 2014 alone, “…71% of that net 
coverage gain was attributable to the Obamacare expansion of Medicaid to able-
bodied, working age adults” (Haislmaier & Gonshorowski, 2014). Despite these 
gains, several states still refuse to expand their Medicaid programs, arguing it would 
be too costly to do so. However, a report issued by the Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation found that the federal government would bear the majority of costs 
associated with Medicaid expansion with states bearing only modest costs in 
comparison (Holahan et al., 2012). Moreover, most states who have elected to expand 
their Medicaid programs have acquired small net budget savings while significantly 
decreasing their number of uninsured individuals. Ultimately, while it seems all of the 
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ACA’s provisions have worked together to expand coverage, Medicaid expansions 
have elicited the largest gains.  
iv. INCREASING PROMINANCE OF HIGH DEDUCTIBLE PLANS 
MAKES AFFORDABILITY STILL AN ISSUE 
While the ACA has expanded coverage, its efforts to improve affordability 
may have actually made health insurance even less affordable for a substantial portion 
of Americans (Evans, 2016; Wharam et al., 2013). As previously mentioned, the 
ACA’s cost-control mechanisms are sparse. Unfortunately, according to Wharam et 
al. (2013), “Mandating coverage while requiring affordable premiums without 
enacting other cost-control mechanisms almost inevitably gives rise to increased cost 
sharing as the simplest mechanism for reducing premiums” (1481). Increased cost 
sharing essentially means enrollees will be required to pay a greater portion of the 
costs associated with their medical care. Typically, this takes of the form of high-
deductible health plans (HDHPs), which “…require annual out-of-pocket payments of 
$1,000 to $10,000 for many services before more comprehensive coverage begins” 
(Wharam et al., 2013, 1481; Claxton et al., 2013). HDHPs may be especially 
attractive to small employers recently forced to provide insurance benefits under the 
ACA since they are the least expensive option, while larger employers may adopt 
HDHPs to fulfill ACA-mandated premium levels and avoid significant penalty taxes 
to be imposed in 2018 (Wharam et al., 2013). The greatest financial burden will be 
imposed on middle-income Americans who could be forced to pay out-of-pocket 
payments up to 27% of their annual income.  
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The ACA’s lack of cost-control mechanisms and mandate for affordable 
coverage has caused HDHP plans to become increasingly predominant, imposing 
significant financial burdens upon many Americans (Wharam et al., 2013; “U.S. 
Employees,” 2012). If the predominance of these plans continues to grow, many 
Americans who were sufficiently covered before the ACA may become underinsured 
(Wharam et al., 2013; Claxton & Levitt, 2012). Moreover, the aggregate health and 
economic outcomes of previously uninsured individuals may actually improve 
relatively little under the ACA as HDHPs may effectively transition these individuals 
from being uninsured to underinsured. According to the Commonwealth Fund 
Bicentennial Health Survey, in 2014 alone, 31 million US citizens were underinsured 
(Collins et al., 2015).  Between 2003 and 2011, the percent of Americans with 
HDHPs tripled rose from 3% to 11% (Collins et al., 2015). Much of this growth has 
been associated with the implementation of the ACA. Among the underinsured, in 
2014, over 44% reported not acquiring necessary medical attention due to cost. 
Additionally, 51% of underinsured adults reported they were currently paying off 
medical debt or struggling to do so. Shockingly, this is the same rate as adults who 
remained uninsured during 2014. If this trend continues, acquiring insurance may 
actually not improve socioeconomic outcomes for many Americans. Some 
individuals previously covered may also chose to forego coverage if they realize they 
will essentially face the same financial burden without paying for coverage. 
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II. LOWI’S MODEL AND ITS PREDICTIONS FOR SELECT 
PROVISIONS OF THE ACA 
A. LOWI’S MODEL: EARLY ORIGINS AND THEORETICAL 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Lowi began constructing his theoretical model to fill the gap between political 
theory and research, which he felt early theoretical models failed to do (Schulze, 
1965; Lowi, 1964a; Lowi, 1964b). The unidimensional flaws of the pluralist and 
elitist models drove Lowi create a theoretical model that would be general enough to 
comprehensively explain all political behavior (Schulze, 1965; Lowi, 1964a; Lowi, 
1964b). Lowi sought to create a model that would provide a framework for analyzing 
diverse cases and from these cases produce generalizations that could be supported by 
theoretical evidence. Ultimately, Lowi desired to create a model that was theory-
driven and not self-driven like the pluralist and elitist models. 
Lowi’s work in New York City politics strongly influenced the fundamental 
theoretical assumptions guiding his theoretical model (Schulze, 1965; Lowi, 1964b). 
In his earliest works, Lowi repeatedly emphasized that power was the state’s defining 
characteristic (Lowi, 1972a; Schulze, 1965; Lowi, 1964a; Lowi 1964b). Lowi argued 
that policy was only created when the state exercised its ability to coerce citizens’ 
behaviors, applying positive or negative sanctions. Therefore, according to Lowi, 
public policy was “…a rule formulated by some governmental authority expressing 
an intention to influence the behavior of citizens, individually or collectively, by use 
of positive and negative sanctions” (Nicholson, 2002; Lowi, 1985, 70). Public policy, 
then, was not about the issues themselves but rather about how the state utilized its 
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own power to achieve a given policy goal. Stemming from this idea, Lowi proposed 
that analyzing how public agencies have exercised their power will reveal variations 
in the political process across issue areas (Nicholson, 2002; Lowi, 1985; Lowi, 
1972a). Thus, Lowi believed an analytic model that focused on the state’s application 
of power may provide significant predictive power regarding the outcomes of a given 
policy.  
Early theoretical models, such as elitism and pluralism, functioned according 
to predominant premise that politics created policy (Nicholson, 2002; Lowi, 1972a; 
Lowi, 1971; Schulze, 1965; Lowi, 1964a; Lowi, 1964b). Lowi, however, argued just 
the opposite, proposing that it was, in fact, policy that created politics. Lowi’s model 
operates under the fundamental assumption that the nature of a public policy is what 
determines its surrounding political environment. This fundamental assumption 
distinctly differentiates Lowi’s model from early theoretical models, which all predict 
how politics affects policy.  
B. LOWI’S MODEL: LOWI’S POLICY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
Lowi decided to develop general categories to classify policies given a series 
of general assumptions (Lowi, 1964a). First, Lowi assumed that “…the types of 
relationships to be found among people are determined by their expectations—by 
what they hope to achieve or get from relating to others” (Lowi, 1964a, 688). Thus, if 
this was true, “…in politics, expectations are determined by governmental outputs or 
policies” (Lowi, 1964a, 688). From these assumptions, Lowi concluded: 
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A political relationship is determined by the type of policy a stake, so 
that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of 
political relationship. If power is defined as a share in the making of 
policy, or authoritative allocations, then the political relationship in 
question is a power relationship or, over time, a power structure (Lowi, 
1964a, 688).  
Consequently, from his original assumptions regarding political relationships, Lowi 
concluded that every type of policy would correspond to a characteristic power 
structure. This power structure would in turn summarize how the state exercised its 
power to influence its citizens’ behavior but also how individuals or groups operated 
within this power structure. Thus, to develop a model that would cumulatively predict 
the political environment associated with a given policy, Lowi had to develop a 
policy classification system first.  
A critical component of his theoretical model, Lowi developed a policy 
classification system, classifying policies as one of four policy types: regulatory, 
distributive, redistributive, and constituent (Nicholson, 2002; Lowi, 1971). These four 
types of public policy were then characterized according to two dimensions: 
specificity and applicability of coercion, which distinguished each corresponding 
policy type according to its application of public power. Lowi’s classification system 
is shown on the next page in Table 2. 
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Lowi attached a few theoretical assumptions to this system, which included: 
1) Coerciveness is the primary characteristic of power; 
2) Power is the defining characteristic of the state;  
3) Power is the ability to impose positive benefits or negative 
sanctions, which distinguishes it from influence (Nicholson, 2002; 
Lowi, 1971).  
The “specificity of coercion” dimension analyzes what has influenced the 
state to exert its power (Nicholson, 2002; Lowi, 1971). Under this dimension, 
“individual conduct” suggests the power exerted by the state is due to a single 
individual’s actions and is consequently being exerted to alter the behavior of 
individuals themselves. Speeding tickets are demonstrative of policies with an 
individual specificity of coercion. Essentially, speeding tickets represent the state 
enforcing negative sanctions against a specific individual due to their behavior (the 
Table 2: Lowi’s Original Policy Classification System  
(Nicholson, 2002, 165; Lowi, 1971) 
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decision to speed). Conversely, policies whose applicability of coercion fall under the 
“environment of conduct” category are instances where the state is enforcing benefits 
or sanctions not specifically due to any one individual’s actions but due to the actions 
of the whole or of a group. Sin taxes are an example of such policies. These taxes are 
enacted not because one individual chooses to smoke but because multiple 
individuals are choosing to smoke. Thus, the state enacts these negative sanctions due 
to the behavior of a group of individuals not just a single individual.   
The “likelihood of coercion” dimension assesses the likelihood negative 
sanctions will be imposed upon individuals disregarding the State’s power (i.e. a 
given policy dictated by the state). If such sanctions are likely, the policy is said to 
have an immediate likelihood of coercion, while if these sanctions are not likely, it is 
said to have a remote likelihood of coercion (Nicholson, 2002; Lowi, 1971). 
Returning to the concept of speeding tickets, the likelihood of coercion for speeding 
on a busy interstate or road you know is not frequented by police officers is generally 
quite remote, meaning the probability of incurring the negative ramifications 
(speeding tickets) of violating speeding limits is generally low. Conversely, the 
likelihood of coercion for violating criminal laws, like homicide, is generally 
immediate, or, in other words, someone is nearly always punished for violating this 
legislation.  
In his later work (1972b), Lowi discovered distinct, systematic differences 
between distributive, redistributive, and regulative policies through his analysis of 17 
case studies of legislation from the 1930s-1950s (Nicholson, 2002). Lowi found the 
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dominant actors behind distributive legislation were Congressional Committees while 
the President was virtually absent from the legislative process. Conversely, for 
redistributive legislation, the President was the dominant actor while the influence of 
Congressional Committees was minimal. For regulative policies, regardless of 
whether the President was engaged in the legislative process or not, Congressional 
Committees, specifically party leaders, were the predominant actors with floor action 
dominating the policy making process. A summary of the characteristics of each type 
of policy can be found on the next page in Table 3.  
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Table 3: A Summary of Lowi’s Policy Types 
Policy Dimensions Specificity of Coercion 
(Is the Policy Targeting Group or Individual Behavior?)  
Likelihood of 
Coercion 
(What is the 
Likelihood there will 
be Negative 
Consequences for 
those who Disregard 
the Policy? ) 
Environment of Conduct 
(Policy Targeting Group 
Behavior) 
Individual Conduct 
(Policy Targeting Behavior at 
Individual Level) 
Immediate 
(Negative 
Consequences for 
those who Disregard 
the Policy Likely) 
Redistributive 
 Main actor(s): 
President 
 Intended to 
mandate a given 
behavior from 
groups 
 Essentially, 
reordering the 
private equilibrium 
 Clear benefits to 
some parties and 
losses to others 
(clear “winners” 
and “losers”) 
 Ex. ACA: 
employer mandate  
Regulative 
 Main actor(s): 
Congressional 
Committees—party 
leaders 
 Intended to mandate a 
given behavior from 
individuals 
 “Stick” of governance 
 Clear losses to some 
parties (clear “losers”) 
 Ex. ACA: individual 
mandate  
Remote 
(Negative 
Consequences for 
those who Disregard 
the Policy Unlikely) 
Constituent 
 Procedural rules for 
policy making  
Distributive 
 Main actor(s): 
Congressional 
Committees 
 Intended to encourage a 
given behavior from 
individuals 
 “Carrot” of governance 
 Clear benefits to some 
parties but no parties 
loser or are punished if 
they do not follow policy 
(clear “winners” but no 
clear “losers”) 
 Ex. ACA: Medicaid 
expansion  
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C. LOWI’S MODEL: DISCUSSION OF THE ORIGINAL MODEL 
Having determined and described the four categories of public policy, Lowi 
then analyzed the outcomes of representative policies in each category from 1869-
1930’s (Lowi, 1972a). From these outcomes, he predicted the characteristics of the 
political environment associated with each policy type, constructing the model shown 
below in Figure 3. The numbered groups (1, 2, 3, 4) are characteristics typical of the 
political environment associated with a given policy type. Lowi calls these “marginal 
characteristics.” According to a policy type’s applicability and likelihood of coercion, 
these marginal characteristics will be combined to fully describe the associated 
political environment. While Lowi did make modifications to this original model, 
these will not be discussed since the original model will only be used throughout this 
paper (Nicholson, 2002; Lowi, 2002; Lowi, 1988; Lowi, 1985).  
Figure 3: Lowi’s Original Theoretical Model (Lowi, 1972a) 
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As Figure 3 reflects, each policy type corresponds to a characteristic political 
environment. Because distributive policies have a remote likelihood of coercion, they 
are associated with a political environment dominated by party logrolling (Lowi, 
1972a). In the US, logrolling tends to generate pork-barrel projects, which are 
spending bills hidden inside other bills to get more money for their constituents.  
Predominant logrolling behavior allows policymakers to achieve their own interests 
and goals by ensuring their district policies and pork-barrel projects are passed into 
legislation. Looking at the characteristics typical of policies with an applicability of 
coercion that acts at the individual level (individual conduct), the “local” and 
“interest” characteristics associated with this applicability of coercion describe this 
ability of policymakers to achieve their own localized interests and goals. 
Additionally, the “decentralized” and “disaggregated” characteristics associated with 
this level of applicability of coercion describe the political mechanism of action (i.e. 
distribution of power) associated with distributive policies. Such policies act to 
disperse authoritative power amongst several different entities at the state or local 
level. Thus, the political mechanism of action associated with distributive policies is 
“decentralized” and “disaggregated” in nature. This can be done with each policy 
type to predict the characteristics of its corresponding political environment. 
D. LOWI’S MODEL: CRITICISMS 
As the ACA’s provision for the voluntary expansion of Medicaid 
demonstrated, not all policies are easily classified using Lowi’s typology system. 
Several critics of Lowi’s model, including Lester Salamon, argue the model’s 
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ambiguity makes it difficult to classify policies since policies often embody multiple 
policy types (Nicholson, 2002; Salamon, 2002; Kjellberg, 1977; Hayes, 1978; Wilson 
1974). Since Lowi’s model does not allow for mixed classifications, critics believed 
its predictive power may be limited (Nicholson, 2002). Moreover, Hayes (1978) 
pointed out that some policies may change typology during the policymaking process, 
further restricting the model’s predictive power.  
Lowi himself originally noted another flaw of his model: classifying policies 
“…in terms of their impact of expected impact on society…” produced a limited 
number of policy types and thus also a limited number of functions government could 
perform (Nicholson, 2002; Kjellberg, 1977; Wilson, 1974; Lowi, 1964a, 689). In 
reality, government possesses many more functions that those described by Lowi’s 
model. However, as Lowi mentions, with any model there is some disconnect 
between the theoretical and empirical realm, and in spite of this disconnect, Lowi 
argued his model was much more functional than any other theoretical model. Instead 
of merely describing issue categories, as the pluralist model did, Lowi’s model 
presented functional categories that could be used to classify almost any domestic 
policy and predict its associated political environment. As Lowi supports in his 
several publications, unlike other models, his model was supported by, not 
constructed from, empirical evidence (Nicholson, 2002; Lowi, 1971; Lowi, 1972a).  
Another criticism of Lowi’s model is that policy classifications do not 
consider the social or economic consequences of a given policy (Nicholson, 2002; 
Kjellberg, 1977; Wilson, 1974). However, as Wilson (1974) notes, in order to 
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determine these implications, the institutional context as well as other contextual 
variables must be considered. Lowi (1985) essentially refutes these criticisms by 
claiming that his model is meant to simplify the prediction and classification process. 
If variables other than the relationship between the state power and citizen were 
considered, the classification system would be much more complicated. Thus, like 
any theoretical model, Lowi’s model does possess some fundamental flaws that limit 
its true predictive power.  
E. LOWI’S MODEL: METHODS—GENERATING & EVALUATING 
PREDICTIONS  
To generate predictions using Lowi’s model, the selected predictions of the 
ACA will first be classified using Lowi’s policy classification system. This system 
was discussed in Part II, B and will now be applied to the selected provisions of the 
ACA. After these provisions have been classified, predictions will be generated using 
Lowi’s model (discussed in Part II, C). Finally, Lowi’s predictions will be compared 
to current events to assess their relative accuracy. Since Lowi’s model only generates 
predictions about the political environment associated with implementing a given 
policy, only current events could be used to assess the relative accuracy of Lowi’s 
predictions. The current events used to assess the relative accuracy of Lowi’s 
predictions were discussed in Part A, D, i (political volatility of the ACA).  
Using the policy dimensions previously discussed, Lowi created the four 
policy types shown in Table 2: distributive, regulative, redistributive, and constituent 
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policy (Nicholson, 2002; Lowi, 1971). Each policy type has its own unique set of 
characteristics according to its specificity and likelihood of coercion. Since the ACA 
is such a large, voluminous policy by nature, specific provisions will be selected and 
classified using Lowi’s policy typology system (see Table 2). The four provisions the 
ACA is most well-known for are: its individual mandate; employer mandate; 
voluntary expansion of Medicaid; and, its creation of state and federal health 
insurance marketplaces. Each policy typology will now be discussed and applied to 
the four major provisions of the ACA listed above.  
As indicated in Table 2, distributive policies are associated with an individual 
specificity of coercion and remote likelihood of coercion. Distributive policies’ 
individual specificity of coercion suggests these policies are targeting the actions of 
individuals, but their remote likelihood of coercion indicates parties who disregard 
these policies will suffer few if any consequences. As Lowi mentions, distributive 
polices are essentially the “carrot” of governance. These policies are intentionally 
enacted by the State to encourage a behavior from specific individuals, creating clear 
winners but no clear losers due to their sparse (or non-existent) consequences. Federal 
subsidies are examples of distributive policies. These policies are designed to benefit 
states who electively take them but do not hurt or impose punitive action upon states 
that do not.  
The ACA’s creation of state and federal health insurance marketplaces would 
be considered a distributive policy. This provision is attempting to alter the decisions 
of individuals, specifically to encourage individuals to purchase health insurance 
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from a federal insurance marketplace. Thus, it has an individual specificity of 
coercion. Individuals who chose to not purchase health insurance from a state health 
insurance marketplace are not penalized, suggesting this provision has a remote 
likelihood of coercion. As Table 2 reflects, an individual specificity of coercion and 
remote likelihood of coercion are characteristic of distributive policies. Distributive 
policies, in general, are intended to encourage a given behavior but impose no 
negative sanctions upon those electing to not adopt this behavior. According to 
Lowi’s typology system as well as this general definition of a distributive policy, the 
ACA’s creation of state and federal health insurance marketplaces is a distributive 
provision.  
Like distributive policies, regulative policies correspond to an individual 
specificity of coercion but enact an immediate likelihood of coercion (Nicholson, 
2002; Lowi, 1971). The individual specificity of coercion suggests these policies are 
intended to influence the actions of targeted individuals, while the immediate 
likelihood of coercion suggests individuals ignoring the state’s mandate will suffer 
negative sanctions. Thus, regulative policies are essentially the “stick” of governance 
and are enacted to mandate the actions of targeted individuals, creating identifiable 
losers if ignored. Criminal laws are examples of regulative policies. These policies 
are designed to mandate the actions of individuals and punish those who ignore this 
mandate.  
The individual mandate of the ACA is a regulative provision. The individual 
mandate forces all US citizens to acquire health insurance or face a monetary fee that 
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increases substantially each additional year the individual chooses to not acquire 
health insurance (immediate likelihood of coercion). Clearly, this policy was enacted 
due to individual choices to not purchase health insurance and aims to correct this 
behavior at the individual level (individual specificity of coercion). It also enforces 
clear sanctions upon noncompliant individuals, fulfilling the immediate likelihood of 
coercion emulated by regulative policies. By definition, regulative policies are the 
State’s attempt at mandating individuals to adopt a given behavior by imposing 
negative sanctions upon those who do not. The individual mandate not only possesses 
Lowi’s characteristics of a regulative policy (immediate likelihood of coercion and 
individual specificity of coercion) but also fulfills this general definition of a 
regulative policy.  
Like regulative policies, redistributive policies correspond to an immediate 
likelihood of coercion but are enacted due to an environment of conduct (Nicholson, 
2002; Lowi, 1971). The environmental origins of redistributive policies suggest they 
are enacted in response to a group’s behavior and thus meant to influence or change 
the behavior of a targeted group. The immediate likelihood of coercion suggests these 
policies intend to punish groups ignoring the state’s mandate. Redistributive policies 
generally take resources from one group and give them to another. Essentially, 
redistributive policies are when the state steps in to alter private equilibrium, or the 
order naturally occurring within society prior to state intervention. To do this, 
redistributive policies must influence a group’s behavior and but also use punitive 
measures to ensure compliance, creating clear winners and losers.  
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Applying Lowi’s policy typology system, the employer mandate of the ACA 
is a redistributive provision. The mandate forces employers who were not previously 
providing their employees with health insurance to do so or pay a penalty fee 
(immediate likelihood of coercion). Thus, this provision is attempting to influence 
group behavior, suggesting it has an environmental specificity of coercion. The 
employer mandate’s immediate likelihood of coercion and environmental specificity 
of coercion indicate it is classified as a redistributive policy according to Lowi’s 
policy classification system (see Table 3). This provision also fits the general 
definition of a redistributive policy. As mentioned, redistributive policies attempt to 
alter the private equilibrium. Under the employer mandate, the State is attempting to 
alter (increase) the private equilibrium of employer-provided health insurance 
benefits. The employer mandate could also be viewed as the State’s attempt at 
altering the private distribution of wealth, forcing businesses to give up some of their 
profits and give those profits to employees in the form of nonmonetary compensation 
(i.e. health insurance). Thus, this provision fulfills the general definition of a 
redistributive policy and also possesses Lowi’s characteristics of a redistributive 
policy (immediate likelihood of coercion and environmental specificity of coercion).  
Finally, constituent policies are created due to the environment of conduct and 
correspond to a remote likelihood of coercion (Nicholson, 2002; Lowi, 1971). In his 
early model, Lowi did not develop this policy typology much but proposed 
constituent policies were essentially the procedural rules for policy making. One 
example of a constituent policy would be the Senate’s Byrd Rule. This rule prohibits 
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the Senate from passing a given part of a bill if it would be considered “extraneous” 
according to the criteria set forth under the Byrd Rule. One of the criteria for a 
portion of a bill being “extraneous” and thus impermissible from being passed by the 
Senate is if it would increase the national deficient by a certain amount considered to 
be excessive in nature (Slaughter, 2016). Thus, the Byrd Rule among other rules 
guides how policy making can be conducted in the Senate and would consequently be 
considered a constituent policy using Lowi’s classification system.  
Using the typology system shown in Table 3, the ACA’s provisions for 
Medicaid expansion would be considered a constituent provision since states electing 
to participate in the expansion would receive government subsidies to do so, while 
states who elect to refrain from expansion do not suffer any negative consequences 
(remote likelihood of coercion). The State is attempting to encourage states to 
electively expand their Medicaid programs so that more individuals can be covered 
under Medicaid, targeting the behavior of the states themselves (environment of 
conduct). Consequently, according to Lowi’s policy classification system, this 
provision would be classified as a constituent policy since it possesses a remote 
likelihood of coercion and environment of conduct specificity of coercion. In general, 
constituent policies are policies that govern the policymaking process. Although this 
provision is not governing how policy is made, it does govern how policy is applied. 
Ultimately, the ACA’s provision for voluntary expansion of Medicaid programs is 
attempting to alter (specifically loosen) regulations determining Medicaid eligibility, 
which govern who does and does not qualify for Medicaid coverage. Thus, this 
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provision loosely fulfills the general definition of a constituent policy in some 
regards. Although, when considering the basic definition of a distributive policy (to 
encourage a given behavior but not impose negative sanctions upon those not 
adopting said behavior), it seems to function more like a distributive policy. Its 
distributive function and constituent characteristics makes the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion provision difficult to classify using Lowi’s typology system. This 
provision demonstrates some of the limitations of Lowi’s model, which will be 
discussed in more detail later. 
Taken together, Lowi’s four types of policy “…define the functions of the 
state and its parameters of political activity,” demonstrating how policy creates 
politics (Nicholson, 2002; Lowi, 1971). By breaking down policies into a general 
category, Lowi proposed these categories could then be used to predict the political 
environment associated with each policy type, predicting which actors would be 
involved in the policy making process and what degree of influence they would exert 
over policy outcomes (Tremblay, 2010;  Nicholson, 2002; Lowi, 1971). Shown 
below, Table 4 summarizes the classifications of each ACA provision, which were all 
assigned using Lowi’s classification system (see Tables 2 and 3). 
Table 4: Lowi’s Classifications of Each Selected ACA Provision 
ACA Provision Lowi Policy Type 
Creation of State and Federal Health 
Insurance Marketplaces 
Distributive 
Voluntary Medicaid Expansion Constituent Characteristics 
Distributive Function 
Individual Mandate Regulative 
Employer Mandate Redistributive 
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 Lowi’s model (see Figure 3 found in Part II, C) will now be used to predict 
the characteristics of the political environment associated with each selected 
provision of the ACA. These provisions have already been classified using Lowi’s 
typology system (see Table 4).  
The ACA’s creation of federal and state health insurance marketplaces was 
classified as a distributive policy. Using Figure 3 (follow arrow from distributive 
policy across to 3 and down to 1), Lowi’s model predicts the political environment 
associated with this provision to be dominated by party logrolling. Lowi further 
predicts the political power associated with the creation of these health insurance 
marketplaces will be decentralized and disaggregated in nature, meaning the State 
will give authoritative power (over this policy/provision) to several entities at the 
state and local level. Finally, Lowi also predicts the politics associated with this 
provision will allow individual policymakers to pursue and fulfill their own interests 
at the local or individual level.  
The ACA’s individual mandate was classified as a regulative provision. 
According to Figure 3 (go to regulative policy then follow arrow across to 4 and 
down to 1), the political environment associated with regulative policies is predicted 
to be characterized by the predominance of group behavior, which is marked by the 
formation of interest groups and collective bargaining. As for the ACA’s provision 
creating state and federal health insurance marketplaces, Lowi predicts political 
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power over the implementation and enforcement of the individual mandate will also 
be decentralized and disaggregated. However, unlike the distributive provision, Lowi 
predicts the politics associated with this regulative provision of the ACA will allow 
groups (not individual policymakers) to pursue and fulfill their own interests at a 
local or individual level.  
The employer mandate provision of the ACA was classified as a redistributive 
policy. Applying Lowi’s model (follow arrow across to 4 and down to 2), Lowi 
predicts the political environment corresponding to this redistributive provision will 
be dominated by group behavior, specifically the formation of interest groups and 
predominance of collect bargaining. Unique to this provision, Lowi predicts the 
political power will be centralized, meaning the State itself will be the primary 
authority governing this policy provision. Policymaking associated with this 
provision is predicted to following the systems model. Finally, Lowi also predicts the 
politics associated with this provision will allow groups to pursue and fulfill their 
own ideological goals. 
The ACA’s provision allowing voluntary expansion of state Medicaid 
programs was not easily classified using Lowi’s typology system. As mentioned, 
although it possesses characteristics of a constituent policy (remote likelihood of 
coercion and environment specificity of coercion), the provision functions more like a 
distributive policy by definition. If this provision is classified as a constituent policy, 
Lowi predicts the political environment associated with this provision to be 
dominated by party logrolling. Like the ACA’s redistributive provision, Lowi predicts 
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political power will be centralized with policymaking following the systems 
approach. Again similar to the ACA’s redistributive provision, Lowi predicts the 
politics associated with the ACA’s constituent provision for Medicaid expansion will 
allow groups to pursue and fulfill their own ideological goals. However, if this 
provision was classified as distributive, Lowi would predict a political environment 
still dominated by party logrolling but with power decentralized and disaggregated 
among various authorities at the state and local level. Instead of pursuing ideological 
goals, if this provision was classified as distributive, Lowi predicts its political 
environment would allow individual policymakers to pursue and fulfil their own 
interests at the local or individual level. Since this provision of the ACA is not easily 
classified using Lowi’s typology system, it is difficult to make concrete predictions 
about its corresponding political environment using Lowi’s model. This demonstrates 
one of the fundamental flaws of Lowi’s model noted by many critics. These criticisms 
will be discussed in detail in the next section. Shown on the next page, Table 5 
summarizes the classification of each selected provision of the ACA and well as the 
predictions made regarding each provision’s political environment.   
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Table 5: A Summary of the Predictions Made about the Political 
Environment Associated with Each Provision of the ACA when Applying 
Lowi’s Model 
ACA Provision Policy Type Corresponding Predictions 
(Associated Political Environment) 
Creation of State 
and Federal Health 
Insurance 
Marketplaces 
Distributive 1) Party logrolling predominant 
2) Decentralized and disaggregated 
mechanism of political action  
 Multiple authorities at the state 
or local level 
3) Individual policymakers pursue and 
fulfill interests at local level 
4) Predominant actor(s): Congressional 
Committees 
Individual 
Mandate 
Regulative 1) Group behavior predominant 
 Interest group formation 
 Collective bargaining 
2) Decentralized and disaggregated 
mechanism of political action  
 Multiple authorities at the state 
or local level 
3) Groups pursue and fulfill interests at 
local level 
4) Predominant actor(s): Congressional 
Committees—party leaders 
Employer Mandate Redistributive 1) Group behavior predominant 
 Interest group formation 
 Collective bargaining 
2) Centralized political power 
3) Policymaking follows systems model 
4) Groups pursue and fulfill ideological 
goals 
Voluntary 
Expansion of 
Medicaid 
Constituent 
 or 
Distributive 
 
Predictions if classified constituent: 
1) Party logrolling predominant 
2) Centralized political power 
3) Policymaking follows systems model 
4) Individual policymakers pursue and 
fulfill ideological goals 
 
 
For distributive predictions, see provision 
for creation of state and federal health 
insurance exchanges in 1st row 
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Lowi’s model was applied to the ACA by classifying the selected provisions 
using its classification system and then generating predictions using the model. The 
validity of these predictions was assessed by comparing them to current events 
discussed in Part I, E, i on page 14. As our discussion of the origins and political 
outcomes of the ACA in Part I reflect, the politics dominating the passage of the ACA 
into legislation can essentially be described as polarized party politics with substantial 
logrolling. Unfortunately, the multidimensional nature of the ACA as well as its sheer 
volume made it essentially impossible to classify as a whole, single policy using 
Lowi’s classification system. Thus, Lowi’s model was used to classify the selected, 
major provisions of the ACA and generate predictions regarding the political outcome 
associated with each provision. As mentioned in Part II subpart E, the 
multidimensional nature of one of the provisions of the ACA, the voluntary 
expansion of Medicaid, made it difficult to classify using Lowi’s classification 
system. This illustrated one of the primary limitations of the model: it is does not 
allow for the multidimensional nature of public policies as it does not allow for 
“mixed” categories. Although it was possible to classify specific provisions of the 
ACA and generate predictions corresponding to each provision, the predictions 
generated for each provision were diverse and in some circumstances conflicted (ex. 
predictions for individual mandate and creation of state/federal health insurance 
marketplaces).  
Due to Lowi’s limited classification system, the ACA could not be classified 
as a whole. Only the selected, major provisions of the classification system could be 
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classified using Lowi’s policy classification system, and even then, it was difficult to 
classify one of the ACA’s provisions. Because only the major provisions could be 
classified, the predicted political environments corresponded only to each provision 
and not the ACA as a whole. Since the different provisions were all classified as 
different policy types, their predicted political environments were diverse and in some 
cases conflicting (refer to example listed in paragraph above). Moreover, the political 
environment that has been seen throughout the ACA’s legislative origins (Part I, D) 
and its implementation (Part I, Ei) was not merely associated with one provision 
alone but rather with all the selected provisions together (i.e. with the ACA as a 
whole, single policy). Consequently, this made comparing predictions for each 
provision with the political environment that has been seen throughout the ACA’s 
origins and implementation difficult. Ultimately, Lowi’s model could not be used to 
predict the political environment that has been seen throughout the ACA’s legislative 
origins and implementation.  
Although our application of Lowi’s model is limited only to the ACA, our 
findings suggest Salamon and other critics’ concerns regarding Lowi’s limited policy 
classification system may be quite substantial. In our application of Lowi’s model, we 
were ultimately unable to generate accurate predictions due to our inability to classify 
the ACA as a single policy, which was in turn the result of Lowi’s limited system for 
classifying policies. These findings may suggest the limitations of Lowi’s model 
makes it of no utility to today’s policymakers since, as Salamon alludes to, the 
policies of today are quite diverse and multidimensional in nature.  
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III. SALAMON’S MODEL AND ITS PREDICTIONS FOR SELECTED 
PROVISIONS OF THE ACA 
 
A. SALAMON’S MODEL: ORIGINS, UNDERLYING THEORY, AND 
THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 Salamon created his theoretical model in response to what he termed “new 
governance.” The responsibilities of the federal government have expanded 
significantly since the post-World War II era, and Salamon and Lund (1989) believed 
this expansion was due to a fundamental transformation that had “…occurred over the 
past half century in the underlying structure of the public sector” (Brudney, 1990, 
400). According to Salamon and Lund (1989), “This transformation has involved not 
simply an expansion in the scale and scope of government activity, but more 
importantly, a significant proliferation in the basic tools the public sector uses to 
achieve its objectives” (255). Analyzing literature and case studies throughout the 
1900s, Salamon (2002) noticed that contemporary policymakers seemed to be under 
increasing political pressure due to factors such as “…the growing fragmentation of 
political power, increased complexity of public problems, recent skepticism of 
government, and the preoccupation with efficiency as the major criterion for public 
action” (Salamon, 2002, 37). Salamon believed that because of these pressures 
contemporary policymakers had been forced to “…select those tools of public action 
that are the most difficult to manage and the hardest to keep focused on their public 
objectives” (Salamon, 2002, 37). Ultimately, this kept American policymaking caught 
in a cycle of ineffective policymaking as disappointment with public action 
influenced policymakers to select suboptimal tools of public action that would most 
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likely bring further disappointment. In an attempt to break this cycle, Salamon (2002) 
created his own theoretical model, which he believed presented policymakers with 
“…a systematic body of knowledge that can help policymakers….take advantage of 
the special opportunities and cope with the special challenges…” new, modern policy 
tools bring (19).  
Like Lowi, Lester Salamon believed political theorists and policymakers alike 
needed a set of comprehensive, conceptual tools to “…organize the facts and identify 
patterns that emerge…” across issue areas (Salamon, 1977). With the rise of “new 
governance,” Salamon believed constructing such a model was especially essential to 
helping policymakers sift through the diverse arsenal of modern policy tools and 
select those best suited to achieve their goals.  While Salamon saw the predictive 
potential in existing theoretical models, like Lowi’s, he also believed these models 
had significant limitations that restricted their predictive power. Salamon wanted to 
create a model that would overcome these limitations and better serve the needs of 
“new governance.” Since modern policymakers had such a diverse plethora of policy 
tools at their disposal, Salamon felt it was critical to create a model that would 
provide a diverse, multidimensional classification system, which he and other critics 
felt Lowi’s model failed to do. In constructing his model, Salamon ushered in a new 
wave of thought that focused on classifying policy tools versus policies themselves 
(Fischer et al., 2007).  
Unlike Lowi’s model, Salamon’s model did not classify policies but rather 
policy tools (Salamon, 2002; Salamon, 1989). Salamon (2002) defined a policy tool 
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as a tool of public action that “…is an identifiable method through which collective 
action is structured to address a public problem” (19). Essentially, a policy tool is 
how a given policy achieves its action.1 Policy tools in the same category all have 
certain common features, which Salamon terms defining features (Salamon, 2002, 
19). While tools in the same category have the same defining features, they also have 
design features that vary from one tool to another. Thus, policy tools in the same 
category will have some but not all features in common. According to Salamon 
(2002), policy tools structure action, meaning they “…define who is involved in the 
operation of public programs, what their roles are, and how they relate to each other” 
(19). Specifically, policy tools structure “…‘collective action’ aimed at responding to 
‘public programs’” (Salamon, 2002, 20). In other words, policy tools structure 
government action but also the action of other organizations or groups implementing 
a public policy. This definition expresses the reality that government is not the only 
entity involved in policymaking or implementation.  
Salamon further divided policy tools into two categories: external and 
internal. External policy tools are used to affect both society and government, while 
internal policy tools are intended to only affect government. Salamon (2002) defines 
internal policy tools as “…the procedures that governments use to handle their own 
internal operations” (20). Salamon’s theoretical model specifically focuses on 
                                                          
1 Policy tools are not a part of polices themselves but rather they are a part of the programs policies 
institute. This will be discussed in more detail later in this section.  
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classifying external policy tools. All policies tools, both internal and external, contain 
a number of different elements, which include:  
1) a type of good or activity; 
2) a delivery vehicle for this good or activity; 
3) a delivery system, that is, a set of organizations that are engaged in 
providing the good, service, or activity; 
4) a set of rules, whether formal or informal, defining the 
relationships among the entities that comprise the delivery system 
(Salamon, 2002, 20). 
As these elements suggest, the multidimensional nature of policy tools allows them to 
be classified according to any of their different elements, making no single 
classification possible. Programs employ policy tools to implement their desired 
action. Typically, a program will utilize different combinations of policy tools versus 
a single policy tool to achieve its desired goal. According to Salamon (2002), if 
policy tools are the tools of collective action utilized by programs to achieve their 
goals, public policies, then, must be collections of programs operating in a similar 
field or aimed at some general objective. A table summarizing these definitions can 
be found on the next page in Table 6.  
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Table 6: Basic Terminology Forming the Fundamental Theory of 
Salamon’s Model 
Term Definition 
Policy tool A tool of public action that “…is an 
identifiable method through which 
collective action is structured to 
address a public problem” (Salamon, 
2002, 19) 
  
Defining features The common features all policy tools 
in the same category share 
 
Design features The features that vary among policy 
tools in the same category 
 
External policy tools Policy tools that are used to affect 
both society and government 
 
Salamon’s model specifically 
classifies external policy tools only.  
 
Internal policy tools Policy tools that are intended to only 
affect government. Salamon (2002) 
defines internal policy tools as 
“…the procedures that governments 
use to handle their own internal 
operations” (20). 
 
Program Employ policy tools to implement 
their desired action 
 
Public policy  Collections of programs operating in 
a similar field or aimed at some 
general objective 
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B. SALAMON’S MODEL: HOW THE MODEL CLASSIFIES POLICY 
TOOLS—CRITERIA FOR ASSESING THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
POLICY TOOLS AND POLICY TOOL DIMENSIONS 
Salamon’s model classifies policy tools using a two-step process (Salamon, 
2002). First, the consequences of policy tools are assessed using five different 
criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, equity, manageability, and political legitimacy. 
Salamon (2002) defines effectiveness as being a measure of “…the extent to which an 
activity achieves its intended objectives” (23). Effectiveness does not consider the 
costs involved to produce the results; it merely assesses the extent to which the 
intended results were accomplished (Salamon, 2002). Efficiency, on the other hand, 
considers both the results and costs to generate those results. Ultimately, efficiency 
seeks to determine how much a given result or benefit is worth (cost-wise). Two 
common measures utilized to quantify efficiency are the cost-benefit ratio and cost-
effectiveness ratio. The cost-benefit ratio assigns a dollar value to the benefit or 
results acquired and then calculates the cost-benefit ratio accordingly (ex. $10,000 
cost and $40,000 benefit = 1:4 cost benefit ratio). Conversely, the cost-effectiveness 
ratio does not assign a monetary value to the benefit but rather leaves it in its natural 
unit of measurement.  
 Another criterion Salamon’s model uses to assess the consequences of policy 
tools is equity. Salamon (2002) defines equity as being “…basic fairness—the 
distribution of benefits and costs more or less evenly among all those eligible” (23). 
However, there are two different types of equity when assessing how benefits and 
costs are distributed (Salamon, 2002). Horizontal equity involves treating similar 
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cases similarly, distributing benefits and costs equally amongst beneficiaries. For 
example, two single person households earning $30,000 per year will be forced to pay 
the same amount in taxes under the US tax system. Since these two cases are similar, 
they incur the same costs and thus horizontal equity is achieved. Conversely, vertical 
equity involves treating different cases differently, distributing costs and benefits 
unequally amongst beneficiaries. The US’s progressive tax system achieves vertical 
equity by forcing families of the same size with lower annual incomes to pay less in 
taxes than those with higher annual incomes. Typically, distributive programs 
disperse costs and benefits equally among recipients, while redistributive programs 
tilt the benefits toward and costs away from the disadvantaged.  
 The fourth criterion Salamon’s model uses to assess the outcomes of policy 
tools is manageability or implementability, which Salamon (2002) defines to be 
“…the ease or difficulty involved in operating programs” (24). According to Salamon 
(2002), “…the more complex and convoluted the tool, the more separate actors are 
involved, and the more difficult it is likely to be to manage” (24). Finally, the last 
criterion used to assess policy tool outcomes is political feasibility and perceived 
legitimacy of public action.2 Essentially, this criterion assesses whether a given policy 
tool is likely to receive support and be adopted as legislation. A summary of the 
criteria Salamon’s model uses to assess policy tool outcomes can be found on the next 
page in Table 7.  
                                                          
2 This is one criterion. Salamon has just combined political feasibility and perceived legitimacy into 
one criterion. 
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Table 7: Salamon’s Definitions of the Five Different Criteria used to 
Assess the Consequences of Policy Tools 
Term Definition 
Effectiveness “…measures the extent to which an 
activity achieves its intended 
objectives by focusing exclusively 
on results” (Salamon, 2002, 23) 
 
Does NOT consider the costs 
involved 
 
Efficiency “…balances the results against 
costs” (Salamon, 2002, 23) 
 
Ultimately seeks to determine how 
much a given result or benefit is 
worth (cost-wise).  
 
Common measures: cost-benefit 
ratio and cost-effectiveness ratio 
 
Equity  “…basic fairness—the distribution 
of benefits and costs more or less 
evenly among all those eligible” 
(Salamon, 2002, 23). 
 
Different types 
1) Horizontal equity: involves 
treating similar cases similarly, 
distributing benefits and costs 
equally amongst beneficiaries 
2) Vertical equity: involves 
treating different cases 
differently, distributing costs 
and benefits unequally amongst 
beneficiaries. 
 
Manageability  
(Implementability) 
“…the ease or difficulty involved 
in operating programs” (Salamon, 
2002, 24).  
 
Legitimacy/Political support 
(Political feasibility) 
whether a given policy tool is 
likely to receive support and be 
adopted as legislation. 
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 Considering the criteria discussed above, Salamon (2002) uses four 
dimensions of policy tools to “…classify tools for analytical purposes…” but also to 
predict how these dimensions will affect each of the five criteria of policy outcomes. 
The four dimensions of policy tools Salamon’s model uses are: coercion (degree of 
coercion), directness, automaticity, and visibility. 
 Salamon (2002) defines coercion as a measure of “…the extent to which a 
tool restricts individual or group behavior as opposed to merely encouraging or 
discouraging it” (25). Although, like Lowi, Salamon recognizes nearly all forms of 
government action involve some degree of coercion, he proposes the extent of 
coercion used varies significantly amongst different policy tools. Tools that are at the 
low end of the coerciveness scale “…essentially rely on the voluntary cooperation of 
individuals and groups for their effects” (Salamon, 2002, 25). Examples of tools with 
a low degree of coercion include tax expenditures, public information campaigns, and 
tort liability. Policy tools with a moderate degree of coercion “…are still in some 
sense voluntary…since the citizen is still permitted to engage in the penalized 
behavior but has to pay a fine or tax on it” (Salamon, 2002, 25). Tools on the medium 
end of the coerciveness spectrum are typically those that deliver subsidies. Vouchers, 
grants-in-aid, loan guarantees, direct loans, contracting, mandatory labeling, and 
corrective fees and charges are all examples of such programs and are listed in order 
of increasing coercion. Finally, policy tools that exhibit high levels of coercion are 
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generally “…social and economic regulations, both of which impose formal 
limitations on activities considered undesirable” (Salamon, 2002, 26).3   
 The second dimension of policy tools Salamon’s model uses is directness. 
Salamon (2002) defines directness as measuring “…the extent to which the entity 
authorizing, financing, or inaugurating a public activity is involved in carrying it out” 
(29). Like the coercion dimension, policy tools can have varying degrees of directness 
(Salamon, 2002). A tool that is authorized, funded, and implemented by the 
government possesses the greatest degree of directness possible. Such tools are 
considered to be direct policy tools. On the opposite end of the spectrum, tools that 
are privately funded and executed are considered to have the least degree of 
directness. These tools are considered to be indirect policy tools. Tools that are 
publically funded and privately delivered or privately funded and publically delivered 
have a moderate degree of directness and are considered to be neither direct nor 
indirect.  
 Automaticity is Salamon’s third dimension of policy tools. According to 
Salamon (2002), automaticity is “…the extent to which a tool utilizes an existing 
administrative structure to produce its effect rather than having to create its own 
special administrative apparatus” (32). As with the other policy dimensions discussed 
so far, tools can also have varying degrees of automaticity (Salamon, 2002). Salamon 
                                                          
3 Government action that sets prices or limitations on firms entering a given market is defined as 
economic regulation. Minimum wage and anti-trust legislation would both be examples of economic 
regulation. Social regulation is defined as a series of rules or regulations defining what is 
impermissible or permissible behavior for citizens, firms, or government agencies. Criminal legislation 
would be an example of this kind of regulation.  
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classifies several policy tools according to their degrees of automaticity in a Figure 
that will be discussed later.  
The final dimension of policy tools addressed in Salamon’s model is visibility, 
which is defined as “…the extent to which the resources devoted to a tool show up in 
the normal government budgeting and policy review processes” (Salamon, 2002, 35). 
Again, as with the other policies dimensions, tools can have various degrees of 
visibility. Both the direct and indirect costs of a visible policy (highest degree of 
visibility) will be evident in the government budget. Shown on the next page, Table 8 
summarizes Salamon’s policy tool dimensions.  
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Table 8: A Summary of Salamon’s Policy Tool Dimensions 
Term Definition 
Coerciveness  “…the extent to which a tool 
restricts individual or group 
behavior as opposed to merely 
encouraging or discouraging it” 
(Salamon, 2002, 25). 
Directness  Measures “…the extent to which 
the entity authorizing, financing, 
or inaugurating a public activity is 
involved in carrying it out” 
(Salamon, 2002, 29) 
 
Direct policy (most direct): 
publically financed and executed 
 
Indirect policy (least direct): 
privately financed and executed 
Automaticity  “…the extent to which a tool 
utilizes an existing administrative 
structure to produce its effect 
rather than having to create its 
own special administrative 
apparatus” (Salamon, 2002, 32). 
Visibility “…the extent to which the 
resources devoted to a tool show 
up in the normal government 
budgeting and policy review 
processes” (Salamon, 2002, 35). 
 
Visible policy (most visible): 
direct and indirect costs in 
government budget 
 
C. SALAMON’S MODEL: DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL 
Salamon’s model ultimately combines the five criteria for assessing policy 
tool outcomes and four policy tool dimensions previously discussed (Salamon, 2002). 
Salamon analyzed numerous policy tools of the same dimension (and degree of) to 
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develop conclusions about how various degrees of the four policy tool dimensions 
affected the five different criteria for assessing policy outcomes. Generated from this 
analysis, Salamon’s conclusions regarding how the various degrees of each policy 
tool dimension will affect the five different criteria are shown below in Figures 4A-
4D. Representative policies are also provided in these tables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4A: Salamon’s Predictions for Policy Tools Grouped by 
Various Degrees of Coercion (Salamon, 2002, 26) 
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Figure 4C: Salamon’s Predictions for Policy Tools Grouped by 
Various Degrees of Automaticity (Salamon, 2002, 33) 
Figure 4B: Salamon’s Predictions for Policy Tools Grouped by 
Various Degrees of Directness (Salamon, 2002, 29) 
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Cumulatively, Figures 4A-D are Salamon’s predictive model. These figures 
can be used to predict the likely outcomes of using a policy tool of certain 
dimensions. For example, in the case of grants-in-aid, according to Figure 4D, these 
policies tools possess a high degree of visibility, which Salamon predicts will have 
high efficiency and equity but low manageability and legitimacy. Implied in Figure 
4D, Salamon found that visibility did not have any effect on the effectiveness of a 
given policy tool’s outcome (hence N/A). As Figures 4A-D suggest, a given policy 
tool can be analyzed among multiple dimensions (visibility, coerciveness, etc.). Thus, 
the predicted outcomes of a given policy tool depend upon which policy dimension is 
Figure 4D: Salamon’s Predictions for Policy Tools Grouped by 
Various Degrees of Visibility (Salamon, 2002, 36) 
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being assessed, meaning a single policy tool can have multiplied predicted outcomes 
when using Salamon’s model.  
D. SALAMON’S MODEL: LIMITATIONS OF TOOLS-BASED MODELS 
The diverse, multidimensional nature of policy tools has made it difficult for 
theorists to come to a clear consensus regarding the numbers and types of policy tools 
that exist (Salamon, 2002). Throughout the development of the tools approach, 
several different classification systems have been developed, which all classify policy 
tools according to different dimensions (Salamon, 2002). For example, Schneider and 
Ingram classified tools according to the behaviors that the programs utilizing them 
sought to modify, while Vedung classified policy tools according to the original 
system developed by F.C.J. van der Doelen that classified tools based on their degree 
of coercion (Salamon, 2002; Vedung, 1997; Schneider & Ingram, 1990). Considering 
no consensus has or really can even be reached regarding how to classify policy tools, 
some analysts question their true predictive power (Salamon, 2002; Lindblom, 1990). 
As our classification of the ACA’s policy tools using Salamon’s model revealed, 
several different predictions can be made for a single policy tool depending upon 
which policy dimension is being used. However, Salamon (2002) argues the diverse 
nature of policy tools is actually one of the primary benefits of using a tools-based 
approach. Salamon (2002) asserts that “…multiple classifications of tools are entirely 
appropriate since different classifications will highlight different facets” (22).  
Whether this diversity makes a tools-based approach have stronger or weaker 
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predictive power remains unclear since no empirical data exists that supports the 
accuracy or reliability of predictions made using tools-based models.  
One limitation of Salamon’s model in particular is that it is limited to 
functions of the federal government (Mauldin, 2005; Salamon, 2002; Salamon, 1989). 
Consequently, Salamon’s model can only be used to predict policy outcomes for 
policy tools “…operating within this federal system” (Mauldin, 2005, 33). Other 
tools-based approaches, such as that constructed by Schneider and Ingram (1990), 
have taken a more general approach than Salamon at classifying policy tools, making 
these models applicable to all levels of government (Mauldin, 2005).  
E. SALAMON’S MODEL: METHODS—GENERATING & EVALUATING 
PREDICTIONS 
To generate predictions using Salamon’s model, the selected provisions of the 
ACA will first classified using Salamon’s policy tool dimensions. This system was 
discussed in Part III, B. Next, Salamon’s model will be used to generate predictions 
regarding the outcomes of policy tools according to his criteria for assessing the 
consequences of policy tools. These criteria are discussed in Part III, B and were 
discussed within the context of the model in Part III, C. To assess the relative 
accuracy of these predictions, they will be compared to current events and data 
regarding the outcomes of the ACA discussed in Part A, E, i-iv.  
Salamon’s model will now be used to predict the outcomes of each selected 
provision of the ACA. To relate Salamon’s predictions to Lowi’s, all provisions will 
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be classified according to their tools’ degrees of coercion. In order to make 
predictions using Salamon’s model, the policy tool of each provision must first be 
determined.  
 Referring to Figure 4A, the ACA’s creation of federal and state health 
insurance marketplaces would have a medium degree of coercion. This provision is 
creating a health insurance program through government and thus its policy tool is 
considered to be the “insurance” illustrative tool listed in the medium degree of 
coercion category. Considering Salamon’s definition of coercion (see Table 9), this 
provision is a moderately coercive policy by definition since it does allow consumers 
to choose whether or not they will purchase insurance through the government or 
another provider. As shown in Figure 4A, Salamon predicts the outcomes of 
moderately coercive policy tools will have high efficiency but only moderate 
effectiveness, equity, manageability, and legitimacy.  
 The policy tool employed by the ACA’s individual mandate is considered to 
be the ‘social regulation’ illustrative tool in the high degree of coercion category in 
Figure 4A. The individual mandate stipulates all citizens must purchase health 
insurance or pay an increasing penalty fine. Thus, this provision is demonstrative of 
social regulations since the government is dictating a behavior that is not permissible 
of citizens (i.e. not purchasing health insurance). Shown in Figure 4A, Salamon 
predicts the outcomes of highly coercive policy tools will achieve high effectiveness 
and equity but low manageability. If such policy tools achieve trivial public costs but 
significantly larger social costs, Salamon predicts they will achieve high efficiency 
67 
 
when assessed in terms of public costs but low efficiency when viewed in terms of 
social costs hence the “High/Low” prediction. The same is true for the predicted 
legitimacy of highly coercive policies. The employer mandate uses the same policy 
tool as the individual mandate: social regulation. Consequently, Salamon’s 
predictions discussed for the individual mandate’s policy tool are the same as those 
predicted for the employer mandate.  
 Finally, the ACA’s provision for voluntary state expansion of Medicaid 
programs employs the ‘grants-in-aid’ policy tool listed in the medium coercive 
category. Grants-in-aid are grants distributed by the central government to state or 
local governments for a specific program endorsed by the federal government. The 
ACA’s voluntary expansion of Medicaid uses grants-in-aid to encourage states to 
expand their Medicaid programs by providing states participating states with grants to 
do so. Since grants-in-aid are a moderately coercive policy tool, Salamon predicts the 
outcome associated with this tool will achieve high efficiency but only moderate 
effectiveness, equity, manageability, and legitimacy. Salamon’s predictions for each 
provision’s policy tool can be found on the next page in Table 9.  
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 Table 9: Summary of Salamon’s Predictions for the Policy Tools 
Corresponding to Each ACA Provision 
Provision Policy 
Tool 
Extent of 
Coercion  
Predictions 
Creation of 
state and 
federal health 
insurance 
exchanges 
Insurance Medium Effectiveness: Moderate 
Efficiency: High 
Equity: Moderate 
Manageability: Moderate 
Legitimacy: Moderate 
 
Individual 
mandate 
Social 
Regulation 
High Effectiveness: High 
Efficiency: High/Low 
Equity: High 
Manageability: Low 
Legitimacy: High/Low 
 
Employer 
mandate 
Social 
Regulation 
High Effectiveness: High 
Efficiency: High/Low 
Equity: High 
Manageability: Low 
Legitimacy: High/Low 
 
Voluntary 
expansion of 
Medicaid 
Grants-in-
aid 
Medium Effectiveness: Moderate 
Efficiency: High 
Equity: Moderate 
Manageability: Moderate 
Legitimacy: Moderate 
 
 
As discussed, Salamon’s model was applied to the selected provisions of the 
ACA by first classifying these provisions using Salamon’s policy tool dimensions and 
then applying the model to generate predictions. The relative accuracy of these 
provisions was assessed by comparing them to current data and trends regarding the 
ACA discussed in Part I, E. Since Salamon’s model classifies policy tools instead of 
policies themselves, it was much easier to use this model to generate predictions for 
the various provisions of the ACA. As previously mentioned, although Salamon’s 
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model does allow for the multidimensional nature of public policy (versus Lowi’s 
model which limits policy types), diverse predictions can be made for a given policy 
tool depending on what policy dimension is being used. Because Lowi’s model 
generated predictions according to policies’ levels of coercion, the coerciveness 
policy tool dimension was used to generate predictions using Salamon’s model.  
 Salamon’s predictions achieved a mixed success when comparing his 
predictions to current data and trends regarding the ACA.4 For the creation of federal 
and state health insurance exchanges, Salamon predicted moderate effectiveness, 
equity, manageability, and feasibility with high efficiency. In reality, the CO-OPs did 
achieve a moderate level of effectiveness, equity, manageability, and feasibility. 
While they did expand coverage for many Americans, this portion was a very small 
percentage of the population. Although subsidies were provided to qualifying low-
income families, they disappeared quickly for some low-income groups and were 
found to not reduce financial barriers enough for others. Additionally, failed CO-OPs 
caused many insured under marketplace plans to lose their coverage, forcing them to 
obtain coverage from outside providers. Thus, while low-income individuals could 
purchase public insurance in some states, individuals in the same income bracket 
could not purchase the same insurance in another. Considering these factors, this 
provision of the ACA could be said to achieve moderate equity. As the current debate 
over the failed CO-OPs indicate, this provision achieved a moderate level of 
                                                          
4 Data and trends regarding the ACA used to assess the relative validity of Salamon’s predictions were 
discussed in Part I: D & E.  
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feasibility. While some are still of favor in continuing to develop the CO-OPs, 
proposing recent failure should merely be viewed as “‘a small business start-up 
problem,’” others, like Senator Portman believe the social and public costs recently 
experienced are too great to be viewed so lightly (Levin & Goldestein, 2016). The 
success of some CO-OPs but failure of others suggests this provision of the ACA was 
moderately manageable. The only prediction that seemed to deviate from current data 
and trends was Salamon’s prediction of high efficiency. Although the marketplaces 
currently cover around 12.7 million individuals, the failed marketplaces cost the 
federal government over $1.2 billion and caused almost three-quarters of a million 
Americans to lose their coverage. These results suggest the creation of state and 
federal insurance marketplaces achieved a moderate degree of efficiency, achieving 
significant social benefits but also substantial social and public costs.  
 For the individual mandate, Salamon’s model predicted high effectiveness and 
equity with low manageability. He also predicted efficiency and legitimacy to be high 
or low depending on the social and public costs and benefits involved. As mentioned, 
there is no data regarding how many Americans have acquired insurance due to the 
individual mandate. Consequently, we cannot assess the relatively effectiveness or 
efficiency of this provision. This provision did achieve high equity as all citizens are 
forced to acquire insurance or pay some degree of a penalty fine. In terms of 
manageability, empirical data and trends suggest there have been no significant 
problems in implementing the individual mandate, further suggesting that this 
provision achieved a high degree of manageability, which contradicts Salamon’s 
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predictions. The political volatility and GOP attempts to repeal the individual 
mandate suggest this provision achieved a low level of legitimacy. Although a few of 
Salamon’s predictions were comparable to data and current trends, most of his 
predictions for this provision we were unable to compare due to lack of relevant data. 
We do not believe this was ultimately due to any limitations of Salamon’s model but 
rather was due to the nature of the provision itself. As the rest of our conclusions will 
reveal, all other predictions had relevant data to compare with Salamon’s predictions.  
 Salamon’s model predicted the employer mandate would achieve high 
effectiveness and equity with low manageability and high/low efficiency and 
legitimacy. As the data suggests, the employer mandate did increase coverage for 
millions of Americans, suggesting it was a highly effective provision. In terms of 
efficiency, we argue it achieved moderate efficiency versus Salamon’s high/low 
prediction. Although the employer mandate did extend coverage to many Americans, 
it also imposed significant social costs by encouraging employers to switch to 
HDHPs. This transition has imposed a great financial burden upon a substantial 
portion of Americans, causing them to become underinsured. In terms of equity, 
Salamon’s prediction of high equity was fulfilled in reality as all employers of 50 or 
more employees are required to provide health insurance benefits or pay a penalty 
fine. As for efficiency, we also argue this provision achieved a moderate level of 
legitimacy instead of Salamon’s high/low prediction. The GOP was vehemently 
against the employer mandate while the Democrats fought just as strongly for it. 
Finally, there is no empirical data or trends that suggest the employer mandate has 
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been anything but manageable. Consequently, we believe this provision achieved 
high manageability, which directly contradicts Salamon’s prediction of low 
manageability.  
 For the voluntary Medicaid expansions, Salamon predicted moderate 
effectiveness, equity, manageability, and legitimacy with high efficiency. Empirical 
data and trends suggest this provision did achieve moderate effectiveness. Although a 
majority of the gains in insurance coverage under the ACA were attributed to states’ 
voluntary Medicaid expansions, not all states elected to expand their programs. This 
also suggests this provision did indeed achieve moderate equity as not all US citizens 
who could qualify for Medicaid under the ACA were able to do so due to states that 
did not elect to expand their programs. The political turmoil this provision created 
suggests Salamon’s prediction of moderate legitimacy was relatively accurate. 
Although many states readily expanded their Medicaid programs, several filed joint 
lawsuits claiming this portion of the ACA was unconstitutional. Findings issued by 
the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation suggest this provision did achieve Salamon’s 
predicted high efficiency as states electing to expand Medicaid coverage have 
substantially reduced their number of uninsured citizens while also acquiring a small 
net budget savings (Holahan et al., 2012). Empirical data and trends do not suggest 
Medicaid expansion has been difficult for states to manage, contradicting Salamon’s 
prediction of moderate manageability. Shown on the next page, Table 10 summarizes 
Salamon’s predictions and their relative accuracy when compared with current data 
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and trends regarding the ACA. Salamon’s predictions listed in red were those that 
were considered to be inaccurate upon comparison with current data and trends.  
Table 10: Summary of Salamon’s Predictions for the Policy Tools 
Corresponding to Each ACA Provision & What was Found to Have 
Actually Occurred in Reality from Our Discussion of Current Data and 
Trends Regarding the ACA 
Provision Salamon’s Predictions Outcome in Reality 
(Determined by Discussion of 
Current Data and Trends 
Regarding the ACA—See 
Part I: D & E) 
Creation of 
state and 
federal health 
insurance 
exchanges 
Effectiveness: Moderate 
Efficiency: High 
Equity: Moderate 
Manageability: Moderate 
Legitimacy: Moderate 
 
Effectiveness: Moderate 
Efficiency: Moderate  
Equity: Moderate 
Manageability: Moderate 
Legitimacy: Moderate 
 
Individual 
mandate 
Effectiveness: High 
Efficiency: High/Low 
Equity: High 
Manageability: Low 
Legitimacy: High/Low 
 
Effectiveness: no data for 
comparison 
Efficiency: no data for 
comparison 
Equity: High 
Manageability: High 
Legitimacy: High/Low 
 
Employer 
mandate 
Effectiveness: High 
Efficiency: High/Low 
Equity: High 
Manageability: Low 
Legitimacy: High/Low 
 
Effectiveness: High 
Efficiency: Moderate 
Equity: High 
Manageability: High 
Legitimacy: Moderate 
 
Voluntary 
expansion of 
Medicaid 
Effectiveness: Moderate 
Efficiency: High 
Equity: Moderate 
Manageability: Moderate 
Legitimacy: Moderate 
 
Effectiveness: Moderate 
Efficiency: High 
Equity: Moderate 
Manageability: High 
Legitimacy: Moderate 
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 As Table 10 reflects, Salamon’s model was able to accurately predict most of 
the outcomes associated with the various policy tools implemented by the ACA. 
Although our application of Salamon’s model was restricted only to the ACA’s policy 
tools, our findings suggest it may be of great utility to policymakers since most of its 
generated predictions were considered to be relatively accurate upon comparison to 
current data and trends regarding the ACA.  
 Although Salamon’s model was able to accurately predict most of the 
outcomes associated with the various policy tools implemented by the ACA, the 
replicability of these results is questionable. Salamon’s model does not clearly define 
its policy tool outcomes. The model does not clarify what a low, moderate, or highly 
effective, efficient, equitable, manageable, or legitimate policy tool outcome is. 
Consequently, how we assesses the relative validity of Salamon’s predictions was 
somewhat biased and may not be replicable. To make the model more useful to 
policymakers, future work should clarify what a low, moderate, or highly effective 
policy tool outcome is (effective, efficient, etc.). This will create a standardized 
method for assessing the relative validity of the model’s predictions.  
IV. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING THE MODELS 
As mentioned, both Salamon and Lowi’s theoretical models sought to serve 
the same purpose: to generate predictions. However, the models differ regarding what 
they intend to predict. Lowi’s model is intended to predict the political environment 
associated with a given policy, while Salamon’s model intends to predict the outcome 
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of implementing certain policy tools.5 Thus, the purpose of applying both models to 
the ACA was to generate a comprehensive prediction, predicting the political 
environment associated with each provision as well as the outcomes associated with 
each policy tool implemented by the ACA.6 The models were also constructed very 
differently.  
Lowi’s model was constructed according to the underlying assumption that 
policy creates politics. Consequently, Lowi’s model attempted to predict the political 
environment associated with a policy by classifying a given policy to be one of four 
different policy types (Lowi, 2002; Lowi, 1988; Lowi, 1972a). Lowi’s model 
classified policies according to how the State exercised its power to coerce citizens’ 
behavior, analyzing policies’ coercion along two different dimensions: likelihood of 
coercion and applicability of coercion. Thus, Lowi’s series of predictions regarding a 
policy’s corresponding political environment, in turn, depended upon which type of 
policy a given policy was classified as. As several critics of Lowi’s model noted, his 
typology system provided a limited number of policy types and did not allow for 
mixed categories, making classification of many policies quite difficult.  
Salamon believe the limited policy types offered by Lowi’s model 
significantly restricted its predictive power. In turn, Salamon sought to offer 
policymakers a theoretical model that would readily allow for the multidimensional 
                                                          
5 Outcome being in terms of the five criteria Salamon uses to assess the consequences of policy tools. 
Policy tools are tools with a specific degree of a given policy tool dimension (e.g. high coerciveness or 
low automaticity).  
6 In this paper, each selected provision of the ACA were considered to be policy tools.  
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nature of public policies. Unlike Lowi’s model, Salamon’s model was constructed 
according to the underlying assumption that policy tools create politics (Salamon, 
2002). Salamon defined policy tools as essentially the collective action through which 
a program dictated by a given policy operates to achieve its desired purpose. Salamon 
classified policy tools according to several policy tool dimensions, which were levels 
of coercion, directness, automaticity, and visibility. Because any given policy tool 
could have one or more of these policy tool dimensions, Salamon’s model could 
generate multiple predictions regarding the outcomes associated with a given policy 
tool. Although this made the model more realistic in the sense that it allowed for the 
multidimensional nature of policy tools, it also somewhat limited the model’s 
predictive power since any given policy tool can have multiple predictions depending 
on which policy tool dimension is being assessed.  
Both Salamon and Lowi’s models were used to generate predictions. Lowi’s 
model generated predictions regarding the political environment associated with 
select provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), while Salamon’s model 
predicted the outcomes associated with each policy tool implemented by the ACA. As 
mentioned, in this paper, each selected provision of the ACA was considered to be a 
policy tool. Since Lowi’s model classifies policies solely regarding their extent of 
coercion, only the coercion policy tool dimension was used when using Salamon’s 
model to generate predictions. This was done to relate the predictions generated by 
both models. However, as the predictions generated by each model reflect, the types 
of predictions generated by each model are quite different. The predictions generated 
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by Lowi’s model describe the political environment associated with each ACA 
provision, while Salamon’s qualitatively describe the outcome associated with 
implement each ACA policy tool. Instead of comparing these predictions to each 
other, we compared them separately to current data, events, and trends regarding the 
ACA.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This study sought to illustrate the potential of tool-based theoretical models 
for accurately predicting the outcomes of policy tools employed by public policies. 
Lowi’s model was applied to the ACA to demonstrate why models must allow for the 
multidimensional nature of public policy. Salamon’s model and other tools-based 
models allow for this multidimensional nature of policy tools, which ultimately 
enables these models to generate useful predictions. Thus, while some critics have 
viewed this characteristic as a flaw, our evaluation illustrates its utility in predicting 
policy tool outcomes. Finally, Salamon’s model was applied to the ACA to 
demonstrate the utility of tool-based models in predicting policy tool outcomes. As 
our evaluation suggests, the model generate relatively accurate predictions but does 
need some improvements to be useful to policymakers. Ultimately, tools-based 
models, like Salamon’s, show significant potential for predicting the outcomes of 
policy tools, and future work should seek to improve these models so that they can be 
useful to policymakers.  
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Our application of Lowi and Salamon’s theoretical models to the ACA 
generated mixed results. Lowi’s model did not generate any useful predictions that 
could be compared with current empirical data and trends. Because Lowi’s model 
does not allow for the multidimensional nature of public policy and presents a very 
limited number of policy types, we were not able to classify the ACA as a single 
policy. Instead, we were forced to classify different provisions of the ACA. The 
predictions generated for these provisions contradicted each other and failed to 
explain the political events that have ensued throughout the ACA’s legislative 
journey and implementation. Our application of Lowi’s model to the ACA illustrates 
one of the primary points this evaluation sought to demonstrate: theoretical models 
must allow for the multidimensional nature of public policy to generate relatively 
accurate and useful predictions. This is what makes Salamon’s model and other tools-
based approaches much more useful than other theoretical models, like Lowi’s.   
As expected, Salamon’s model was much more useful than Lowi’s because it 
allowed for the multidimensional nature of the policy tools public policies employ. 
Although different predictions can be generated depending on the policy tool 
dimension being used, the predictions it did generate when using the coerciveness 
policy tool dimension overall agreed relatively well with current empirical data and 
trends. For the individual mandate, no relevant data or trends existed to assess the 
validity of Salamon’s predictions for the effectiveness and efficiency policy criteria. 
However, as mentioned, we believe this was not due to a flaw or limitation in the 
model but rather due to the nature of the provision itself.  
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Over all, this theoretical study indicates Salamon’s tools-based approach 
could be quite useful to policymakers in predicting the outcomes associated with 
policy tools implemented by programs of public policies. Given the ACA is a very 
large, diverse public policy, the relative accuracy of Salamon’s predictions for its 
policy tools suggests it can be useful for generating predictions associated with policy 
tools implemented by programs of even very large, complex public policies. 
However, in order for it to be useful to policymakers, a standardized method for 
assessing the relative validity of the model’s predictions must be created. Future work 
should address what a low, moderate, or highly effective, efficient, equitable, 
manageable, and legitimate policy tool outcome is so that the validity of the policy 
tool outcomes predicted can be assessed in a replicable manner.  
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